

A Conference Organized by the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian

Russia has not succeeded in creating further frozen conflicts in Ukraine. It has been unable to spark revolt in the rest of the so-called Novorossiia. Russia has not even got control of the land bridge going from the Russian border to Crimea.

showcase for democracy and a free-market economy. It was such a transformation in post war Germany that ultimately made the reunification of Germany possible. The conversion of Ukraine into an attractive and prosperous showcase represents the best chance for Ukraine to regain its lost unity.

The trouble is that the Poroshenko administration has so far done very little. In part, this is due to the war; in part, to the strength of the forces of inertia; in part as well, to a lack of knowledge on how to reform. The Poroshenko administration on 25 February 2015 set out a list of 60 reforms. The lengthy list provides no prioritization, nor any indication on how reforms are to be carried out. That is to be left to the civil society to work out.

The international community is becoming impatient with reforms by declaration.

this area risk not being accepted by all regions of the country. It has been the experience of multilingual and multinational states in Europe and North America that a lack of a consensus on questions of language rights and regional autonomy can lead to a breakup, whereas countries that have worked out a modus vivendi, usually hang together.

You will note that I am not suggesting negotiating with the rebels on language and regionalism. Their ideas have been worked out by Moscow, which is seeking to turn Ukraine into a loose confederation that it can control.

It is a precept of good governance

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Discussant Report

Tatiana Zhurzhenko, in her clear analysis, **From Borderlands to Bloodlands**, suggests that the concentration of the conflict in Donbas and the decline of pro-Russian separatism in other regions in eastern and southern Ukraine raise the question: what has happened to the East-West divide, and is Donbas all that is left of the "East" today? With the annexation of Crimea and the military conflict in the East, the era of post-Soviet ambiguity and tolerance of blurred identities and multiple loyalties has ended. The majority have opted for the Ukrainian state.

She postulates that Ukrainian identity, which for so long had been associated with ethnicity, language and historical memory, suddenly has become territorial and political and thus inclusive for Russian speakers and Russians, as well as for Ukrainian citizens with other ethnic origins. The ugly face of pro-Russian separatism, the everyday terror and the anomie it has brought to Donbas, have had a sobering effect on many potential Russophiles.

She notes that the Maidan has been widely interpreted as a delayed attempt to complete the de-Sovietization of Ukraine and to catch up with the 1989 revolutions in eastern and central Europe. She claims that what prevents the Europeanization of Ukraine is the Ukrainian variant of post-Soviet capitalism corresponding to a specific type of political system rooted in eastern Ukraine. Donbas in particular lacked political diversity and competition. The political monopoly of the Party of Regions, which represented the interests of a single oligarchic clan, prevented the emergence of political alternatives. This model laid a time bomb under the Ukrainian state, as elections turned into formal procedures for legitimizing an unfair and opaque system of power. Unlike in other regions, there were almost no alternative elites in Donbas, which explains why local Euromaidans were marginal.

She points out that the Orange Revolution and Moscow's failure to ensure the victory of the pro-Russian candidate, Viktor Yanukovich, radically changed Moscow's perspective on Ukraine. The revolution was seen as a western coup aimed at undermining

press reports on the conference, they were all Russian citizens. They had arrived in Ukraine in April 2014, February 2014, and July 2014, respectively.

Girkin/Strelkov introduced himself as a Colonel of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), retired from active service as of March 31, 2014.

In July, the United States confirmed observations of Russian artillery and rocket fire over the border into Ukraine.

Regular Russian troops seemed to have been used before the end of August. The Ukrainians captured members of Pskov airborne brigade No. 74268 on 21 August.

The author suggests that an analysis of the evidence shows that the absolute majority of civilian casualties resulted from shelling by Ukrainian forces of population centres used by the separatists as their bases. He gives no basis for this description of a confused situation in which both sides accused the other of being responsible for the same incidents.

A survey conducted for the author by Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) in April/May, apparently after the revolt had begun, indicates that a majority of residents in Donbas - 54% - backed different forms of separatism. Vjg"cwvjqtøu"fghkpkvkqp" of separatism includes not merely secession, but also unilateral demands for greater autonomy or federalism. The author notes that the Ukrainian government has rejected federalism, but he fails to mention that it does favour an undefined decentralization. He states that the Russian government advocates a federal solution for Ukraine, but he does not make it clear enough that the Russian proposals sound like a weak confederation. In the Russian view, the regions would have independent foreign relations and foreign trade, y jkng"tgvcckpki"cxgvq"qxgt"vjg"egpvtcn"iqxgtpogpøu"htgk i p"rqkne{0""Twuukcp"qhhkekcnu" have suggested Bosnia, or Greenland in its relationship to Denmark, as models. Neither of these units are genuine federations. Greenland is on the verge of independence. Bosnia is barely a confederation.

The survey also shows that 23% of those surveyed favoured autonomy, compared with 8% for independence, and 23% for joining Russia. The author does not explain the difference between his broad definition of separatism, and autonomy or independence.

The study concludes that all major actors, including the Russian and Western governments, have contributed to the violent conflict in Donbas and the de facto breakup of Ukraine. He does not describe, however, what precisely is the Western responsibility. The author believes that it would be practically impossible to resolve the conflict in Donbas completely and permanently and to unite Ukraine again.